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Eleonora Vindau. Abigail Seldin. Cathal Malone. He could have made it, had he not been forced into a pseudo cooperation with Mao against the Japanese. That allowed the communists to survive and wrestle national power from the KMT after the war. In fact, serious battles were fought in earnest, with many losses.
After all, China was never fully occupied, but held out in large parts, tying down Japanese armies. Stilwell lacked insight into the Chinese power struggle and he lacked diplomatic skills. Without doubt, this negative attitude towards CKS at the end of the war led to reduced support and thus to the communist victory. Explaining this by a communist conspiracy inside the American camp is however not justified.
There was much honest misjudgment. Stilwell was not the only wrong appointment. American attitudes towards 'Chiang vs Mao' were based on wishful thinking and produced a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Chinese communists were not the reasonable bunch that a half informed comparison to the ineffective, corrupt and vicious Nationalist rule had suggested.
Expecting the Communists to win the civil war facilitated just that. Anyway, the claim that the USA 'lost China' is based on illusions over the American influence in the world. Anyway, the key pre-condition for the communist victory in China had been the Japanese invasion.
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The KMT would otherwise very likely have crushed the communists. Anyway, the fate of Sino-American friendship was ultimately decided elsewhere. The war in Europe came to an end.
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The Soviets invaded Manchuria and made the communist victory practically unavoidable, unless the USA was prepared to provide massive military and manpower support to the KMT. Truman's priority was different: get American soldiers out of this war. Not another big war. The American alliance with Uncle Joe, in which FDR had believed fervently and naively, came unstuck and turned into its opposite.
Cold War started. Riens ne va plus between China and the USA, for a while. George Marshall's last ditch effort to avoid civil war by negotiating a compromise was based on wrong understandings of the relations between the antagonists and therefore hopelessly stillborn, though false hopes had flared up briefly.
One serious error needs correction: on page it is said that the May Fourth Movement preceded World War 1. Absolutely not. This is a great book for anyone interested in the fate of China during WW2. It answers the question of, "Who lost China? The correct question is "What happened? Anyone interested in going into foreign service work should read this book to get a flavor of dealing with complex diplomatic problems.
You will learn that you don't give important diplomatic jobs to tall, well groomed, articulate,distinguished looking men who scare the crap out of people by yelling out Indian war calls when thy get off of planes. This book gives a nice introduction to the McCarthy hysteria that paralyzed adult thinking about foreign policy after WW2. The information in this book is broad and eye-opening; its conclusions are sound.
The book is probably definitive about a great debate in American foreign affairs: "Who lost China, and how"? First, the title is misleading. The book actually covers, as it should for this topic, a much wider period than Second, its main thesis, though more convincing than not, could be more solidly argued.
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To cut to the chase: Bernstein feels that the Soviet takeover of Manchuria in northern China during mid, which happened as part of the USSR's entry into World War II against Japan, rendered the eventual Communist takeover of China in very likely, if not inevitable.
That was because Mao and Stalin, natural allies, aided each other, and the Soviets used their new controlling presence in northern China to enable the Communist Chinese under Mao to secure the latter's hold in the north -- a key portion -- of the country. The story the author tells, mostly going through , and the circumstances he describes -- including America's postwar hesitation or inability to deploy troops and materiel in support of Chiang Kai-shek -- do tend to back that up.
But that point needs to be demonstrated and defended somewhat better and more definitively than is done here. That could have been done chiefly by providing somewhat more logistics-oriented and strategic information, and doing so regarding a longer period, i.
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The absence of that quantitative information cannot be justified by a fear that it might bog down the flow in mind-numbing statistics. Indeed, one of the strengths of the book and its writer is that when the author does address such numbers-heavy questions which he does regarding the case of the significance of the air supply routes to China from India during the earlier s , he is quite good at doing so. He illustrates his point rapidly with actual figures, and with tales of the human exploits behind the numbers.
He explains well the nature of the supply systems and their changing importance. An additional premise that is not powerfully argued is found in the author's repeated assertion that Mao and Stalin were natural and inevitable allies. But this is expressed more as a matter of flat assumption and inference than by direct sourcing of incidents and data.
In fact, some of the characteristically valuable research in the book tells an opposite story, of recurring strong tension and countervailing interests between the two. While Bernstein is probably correct in his overall premise on that subject, that premise needs some firming with more data and argument because of its centrality.
Stylistically, the book tends to circle back on its narrative quite a bit so that it can come across as a muddy mix of topical and narrative presentation. This is too bad because the basic presentation is often otherwise rather good. There are significant gems and outcroppings of important facts that are well-explained throughout, e. Minor pedantic irritation -- Bernstein refers to Orwell's "minute of hate" in the latter's "", when it was actually the Two Minutes Hate.
While Bernstein somewhat successfully acquits America's military and diplomatic China hands of the day of any evil treasonous plotting other than the evil of making slanderous accusations against each other or of having any pro-Communist partisanship, his failure to conclusively support the larger points weakens this somewhat. Since his acquittal of the foreign affairs professionals appears to depend on the validity of his major thesis that Soviet assistance had rendered Mao too powerful to be tamed, I wish again that that thesis had been more thoroughly and factually supported.
That is, he shows that America's foreign affairs statesmen and personnel failed to stop Mao not by any real failing of their own but because they were up against a force too empowered to be resisted with the diplomatic and military tools available to them, and so neither treason nor broad incompetence should be attributed to them. This book should be, and may yet prove to be, the last word on the reasons for Mao's rise to victory in the face of active efforts by the victorious USA and its China teams to stop it.
But it could also have been the best word too, if better delivered. Still, the book is strongly recommended as a resource and for much good content, and the overall validity of its important theme.
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Additional note: Chiang Kai-shek is portrayed as a hapless but benign victim of corrupt and reactionary non-Communist Chinese politics which are not very adequately explained and the difficulties of wartime, including the burgeoning Chinese civil war. But he is nevertheless right to show and assert the utter destructiveness of Mao's Communists in comparison to Chiang's s regime.
Tedious book that goes thru tangential details but when it finally makes its points they seem to be well supported. The only problem with the book is the consistent support that the Chinese government under Chiang was really fighting the Japanese and the Communists were just sitting out in the hinterlands opportunistically waiting for their chance.