Unlike Yohannes, he systematically favoured his fellow Amhara and the modern "Ethiopian" state became in fact, instead of the traditional equilibrium between the three nationalities, a tightly controlled Amhara preserve. The result was great bitterness among both the Oromo and the Tigreans, a bitterness which was still active enough in the case of the Tigreans to lead them to cooperate with the Italians after the invasion and later to rise in arms against Emperor Haile Selassie when he was restored to the throne by the Bristish Army in World War II.
This succession of events created a lasting feeling of alienation among the Tigreans. They were aware of being, as much as the Amhara, part of the old historical core of Abyssinian society. Yet, with the extension of the Abyssinian empire to the south during the period and the birth of modern Ethiopia, they felt almost more alienated from the centre of power than the recently conquered non-Abyssinians. The continuity between this feeling and modern political action is an ever-present reality in today's Ethiopia. One simple example which shows the powerful presence of the past in the present is the popular name given to the TPLF rebels.
They called themselves woyane patriots which was the name adopted in by the Tigrean rebels fighting Emperor Haile Selassie. The continuity between the two names was deliberate in order to mobilize Tigrean public opinion in the fight against Mengistu and the power emanating from Addis-Ababa between and This was not of course explicit in the official discourse. Both in Asmara and in Addis-Ababa the new regimes were pictured as "national", something which was partly true in Eritrea but definitely inaccurate in Ethiopia.
This comes from the fact that for the "Eritreans" forty years of Italian colonialism and thirty-nine years of political and later military struggle have shaped a sub-identity different from the overall identity they started with. In the words of a Tigrean historian:. The quest for an identity that they [the Eritreo-Tigreans] can feel is distinctly their own made the EPLF revise their past. This burden of a history that they cannot claim as their own alone has generated a feeling of uneasiness and a sense of lowliness Thus, the burden of the past that Eritrea shares with Tigray has been turned into a tabula rasa where an ideological history was written afresh.
The Eritreo-Tigreans were cut off from their past by the Italian conquest and have later decided, in a gesture of politically constructive pride, to turn this handicap into a banner. He fought successively the Egyptians, the Sudanese Mahdists and the Italians in the service of the Emperor. And he fought mostly in Eritrea where he was the founder of the city of Asmara. But this fighting was in defence of a global Abyssinian Empire against foreign enemies, a notion implicitly invalidating the Eritrean claim to independent nationhood and proving than before "Eritrea" was seen and felt as part of Abyssinia.
Thus Ras Alula is today a hero for the Tigreans from Ethiopia and a traitor for the Tigreans from Eritrea, whose ancestors he fought to defend against foreign invaders.
Eritrea | History, Flag, Capital, Population, Map, & Facts | Britannica
Not so to the Tigreans who are passionately aware of their history and feel it as alive. These feelings about history were directly translated into actions during the s when both guerrilla fronts fought side by side against Colonel Mengistu's army. The TPLF had from the start been the junior partner in the relationship with the EPLF for a number of reasons: the Eritrean front was older, better organized, it had more money and equipment and a solid network of international sympathizers which the TPLF almost entirely lacked.
Thus the Eritrean "upstarts" acted superior to their cousins from Tigray while it was the latter who considered themselves to be the true keepers of their people's identity. They also differed in their ideological assessment of the USSR and of the nature of imperialism, important points in those ideologically charged times. This eventually led to open fighting between the two fronts during Although the fighting was sporadic, the hostility remained strong and it was not until the EPLF victory at Afabet in and its donation of a large number of tanks to the TPLF that reconciliation became solid.
None of this has since been forgotten, and we must remember that it is the actors in these quarrels, Meles Zenawi and Issayas Afeworki, who are now the leaders of their respective countries. In post-communist Ethiopia, the regime has of course given considerable importance to its home province of Tigray. Given the relentless hostility of the Oromo and the Amhara to his rule, he cannot survive without his Tigray support. And his Tigray supporters still definitely hold a major grudge towards their Eritrean cousins whom they accuse of being overbearing and of using their position to exploit Ethiopia economically.
The result is that "tradition, prestige and pride" have been and remain at the heart of the confrontation. This makes the conflict very difficult to solve. Material interests can be negotiated. But how do you negotiate divergent traditions, competing prestige and hurt pride? The conflict is all the more intricate for being so immaterial. To this one must add the Sicilian-like traditions of family feuds among high-ranking Abyssinians: when President Issayas Afeworki refuses to evacuate lands he has occupied by force, he is is not arguing his good faith, he is upholding his machismo credentials in a society where negotiating is considered a despicable weakness, which could very easily be seen by his enemies as a sign that he is not equal to his task anymore.
The main diplomatic impact of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict has been the failure of the US-led regional diplomacy. Not only were two friends of Washington at war, but they openly refused to listen to their ally's advice.
This has led to several regional consequences. The main one has to do with Sudan, which was practically at war with both countries. After having at first shunned Sudanese overtures in June, four months later Addis-Ababa opened secret negotiations with Khartoum. NDA military forces in Eritrea have now redeployed to be prepared to face a possible combined Ethio-Sudanese attack on the west of the country.
Djibouti, which was nearly bankrupt after its civil war, is now being ressuscitated due to the closure of Assab to Ethiopia-bound freight. Relations between Addis-Ababa and the small republic or at least its leadership have never been better. Last Spring, Djibouti's strongman Ismail Omar Guelleh, President Hassan Gouled's nephew, even went as far as saying in an interview with an Ethiopian newspaper that relations between the two countries could become "structural" and that France should have no say in the matter.
This was widely interpreted as meaning that Ismail Omar Guelleh, who will be in a very precarious position after his ageing uncle dies, was ready to accept an Ethiopian protectorate over his country. The prospect was serious enough to cause a worried President Gouled to discreetly visit Paris in late October to reassure President Chirac about the future of French military installations in Djibouti. The Somali situation has also been influenced. While Ethiopia is still strongly opposed to the al-Ittihad fundamentalist movement which operates out of the Gedo region and into Ogaden, it has now shifted its stance towards the Somali National Alliance SNA led by Hussein Aydid.
The SNA leader was invited to Addis-Ababa in September and it seems that he could now expect to benefit from Ethiopian help in exchange for keeping al-Ittihad in check. Such a move could seriously affect the precarious balance of forces in southern Somalia and restart inter-clan fighting which has been at a low ebb during the last few months. Eritrea, in its search for allies, has turned towards Egypt and the Arab League. Transnationally, the war will also have an impact on the Afar question.
Divided between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti, they are in conflict with their respective governments in all three countries. Desirous for local support, the Tigrean-led government went along with this arrangement which is most likely only a way of extracting military equipment from Addis-Ababa before returning to war. The Ethio-Eritrean conflict is again on the verge of erupting. It is difficult to imagine how foreign well-wishers could help, given the highly intimate cultural dimension to the quarrel.
Remembering Eritrea-Ethiopia border war: Africa's unfinished conflict
The sq. Hence the refusal of President Issayas Afeworki to withdraw from the areas he has occupied, although they are of no real use for his country. However, the conflict is very unlikely to produce refugees, if by refugees we take the classical meaning of people who flee one country to take refuge in another. Given the fact that the fighting takes place on Tigrean soil and among Tigreans, people will become internally displaced by retreating from the firing line deeper into their own hinterland.
There is absolutely no incentive to cross a border. Nor are there any convenient borders available to be crossed. Abbay, Alemseged. Journal of Modern African Studies. Africa Confidential [London]. The East African. Chris Erasmus. Erlich, Haggai.
The border ruling
Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Addis-Ababa, n. Hess, Richard. Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy. Several seasonal streams that flow eastward from the plateau reach the sea on the Eritrean coast. Eritrea has a wide variety of climatic conditions, produced mainly by differences in elevation. The effects of elevation are seen most clearly in the wide range of temperatures experienced throughout the country.
Mean annual rainfall on the plateau is about 16 to 20 inches to mm , while on the western plain it is less than 16 inches. In both the highlands and the western lowlands, rainfall comes in summer, carried on a southwesterly airstream. Toward the northeastern extremes of the plateau, the amount of precipitation decreases, and the length of the rainy season becomes shorter. The eastern edges of the plateau and, to a lesser extent, the coastal fringes receive much smaller quantities of rain from a northeasterly airstream that arrives in winter and spring.
The interior regions of the Danakil Plain are practically rainless. In addition to the languages spoken by the various ethnic groups, Arabic and English are widely understood. Italian is occasionally used as well. The bulk of the people in the Eritrean highlands are Tigray. They also occupy the adjacent Ethiopian region of Tigray. The Tigrinya language is one of two major indigenous languages in Eritrea. Inhabiting the northernmost part of the Eritrean plateau, as well as lowlands to the east and west, are the Tigre people.
Also occupying the northern plateau are Bilin speakers, whose language belongs to the Cushitic family. The Rashaida are a group of Arabic-speaking nomads who traverse the northern hills. On the southern part of the coastal region live Afar nomads.
The Afars—who also live across the borders in Djibouti and Ethiopia—are known to surrounding peoples as the Danakil, after the region that they inhabit. The coastal strip south of Massawa, as well as the eastern flanks of the plateau, are occupied by Saho pastoralists. In the western plain the dominant people are Beja pastoralists; Beja also live across the border in Sudan.
'Two men fighting over a comb'
Eritrean News and Views. A travers sa voix et sa musique, elle devient l'une des principales ambassadrices culturelles de son pays et du peuple kunama.
Elle revient sur les moments forts de son parcours de musicienne et de combattante. Music for human rights and cultural preservation: the Forde Festival In honor of Black History Month, here are 20 amazing Northeast Africans that have done great things for their country, their people, and the world.