In supporting reconstruction, Riyadh should use its expanding political network to give a boost to state institutions.
- dating meetups near Benin Nigeria!
- online dating sites men near Nezahualcoyotl Mexico?
- matchmaking agency in Changsha China!
Doing so could enhance the credibility of both Saudi allies and the government. For its part, Iraq needs to better prioritise reconstruction projects that create jobs or restore services.
Some of the potential projects advertised at the Kuwait conference — such as urban metro systems — struck investors as vanity projects. Hide Footnote Once projects and investors are identified, the Iraqi National Investment Commission should aim to accelerate paperwork, calling upon political leaders to lean on the bureaucracy if necessary. As is already the case, the Iraqi government should be willing to find financing arrangements that avoid injecting cash into state coffers.
Riyadh can knock down the single greatest public opinion barrier to its engagement with Iraq by taking concrete measures to unravel its historical denial of the legitimacy of Shiite theology and rituals. The Saudi royal family has traditionally left Islamic jurisprudence in the hands of the state-sanctioned Council of Senior Religious Scholars. Without weighing in on theology, the Saudi government could prohibit defamatory language in weekly sermons and online materials, while reviewing curriculum and other state documents for offensive material.
Hide Footnote The kingdom could legislate stronger policies against sectarian labour discrimination, criminalise disparagement of Shiites in the education system, and ensure that its own ministries and agencies deliver services equally to Shiite communities. Hide Footnote These are major steps, but they will be necessary if the kingdom is truly intent on bettering its relationship with Shiites across the region.
Some in Iran are also optimistic about this potential. Hide Footnote The Saudi leadership could also speak publicly about tolerance for Shiite religious practice, as they have begun to do already. This positive sentiment could, however, prove counterproductive if anti-Shiite rhetoric is simply repackaged as anti-Persian discourse that directs the same prejudices toward a new target. Hide Footnote Changing entrenched Saudi Arabian biases against Shiites will take time, but signals from the leadership about what is and is not acceptable in the discourse will help.
Rebuilding these religious sites would be symbolically significant because past Sunni critiques of Shiite practice focus on its supposedly excessive veneration of descendants of the Prophet. A Saudi gesture toward rehabilitation of the shrines would thus be a sign of respect for Shiite rituals. Shiites are highly sensitive to any indication the kingdom might encourage extremism and intolerance. Iraq could become a de-escalation zone in Saudi-Iranian tensions. But, at a minimum, it would require its politicians and officials to proactively identify shared interests between Riyadh and Tehran and encourage both sides to move toward convergence.
Hide Footnote Oil policy could also help build trust, as all three countries would prefer a higher medium-term market price. Whether Iran and Saudi Arabia can be persuaded to actively cooperate on these and other areas of potential alignment remains to be seen, but both would stand to gain. Riyadh and Tehran are now bogged down in costly regional engagements that distract the governments from domestic priorities. Still, for now, the potential for conflict is greater than the prospect of better ties.
Particularly with Shiite religious engagement, Saudi Arabia risks provoking an Iranian reaction if it oversteps or politicises the question of the marjaiya , for example attempting to force a rift between clerics in Najaf and Iran. Hide Footnote Najaf is keenly aware of this dilemma and Riyadh should take cues from there about how best to engage on the religious front. Making clear that the invitation is on the table, for example, Riyadh could leave the time and place for any public or private meetings with clerics in the hands of the marjaiya.
As they have avoided doing so far, Saudi leaders should not mention Ayatollah Sistani in public discussions of politics. Riyadh should take care not to put religious figures — or any Iraqis for that matter — in the position of being asked to choose between Saudi Arabia and Iran as social, cultural or economic partners. Leaders in both countries should be steadfast.
Saudi Arabia has the opportunity to construct a long-term policy toward Iraq that has deep social roots and buy-in. Supporting cross-confessional Iraqi political trends can offer the kingdom a new model of how to boost its influence and shore up regional stability. For Iraq, too, there are important potential benefits: by balancing Saudi and Iranian influence, it can gain from the support of both without alienating either.
In turn, stability in Iraq could have knock-on effects for regional conflicts around its borders, most notably in Syria. A stronger, physically and institutionally rebuilt Iraq would be more resilient against a re-emerging ISIS or any future iteration. Better relations between Saudi Arabia and Shiite communities likewise could help roll back sectarian polarisation across the region, including in the kingdom itself.
Taiwan's coronavirus response is among the best globally
Perhaps the best way to ensure that all sides stay the course is for Iraqis and Saudis to make political, social, economic and cultural investments that engender a dynamic of interdependency between their countries. If, for example, Saudi companies invest in Iraq, and Iraqi consumers come to depend on Saudi goods, the bilateral relationship would be far more sustainable, even in the face of political disputes.
The Iraqi ideal of becoming a bridge between regional powers may be years or decades off, but this optimistic moment is a chance to lay the foundation stones. Riyadh can help, and it should have an interest in doing so. Trade is at a trickle and reconstruction has stalled. Why did it happen? Close to war-torn Syria, Sinjar is vulnerable to external intervention. Sinjar needs political and economic reconstruction if the displaced are to return to their homes.
Footer menu
In Sinjar, as in other disputed territories, this move would entrench non-state groups, compromise the Iraqi state, and perhaps hinder reconstruction and return. Incremental efforts to drive ISIS out of Sinjar, starting in November , have brought peace but no political or economic recovery. Only the effective re-entry of the Iraqi state, mediating between factions and reinstating local governance, can fully stabilise Sinjar, lay the ground-work for reconstruction, allow the displaced to return and end foreign interference.
The problems in Sinjar have their origin in the U. Dysfunctional governance and sectarian strife reduced the role of both the federal government and the administration of Ninewa governorate, in which Sinjar is located, to a symbolic one. Real power was exercised by the party that took advantage of the administrative and security vacuum, the Kurdistan Democratic Party KDP. The KDP co-opted local elites to perform the routine tasks of rule. Yet it won little popularity. It treated the Yazidis, a distinct ethno-religious minority group, as Kurds, which many resent, and as second-class Kurds at that — which they resent even more.
Moreover, it barely disguised its ambition, opposed by many Yazidis, to annex Sinjar to the Kurdish region. These groups then ruled parts of Sinjar, with the KDP controlling others, each recruiting local fighters into their rival militias but neglecting to serve the interests of the Sinjar population, most of whom remained displaced. The escalating U. Turkey, along with the U. The skeletal, KDP-leaning district council and administrative bodies, mainly composed of Yazidis, fled to the Iraqi Kurdish region, joining their Yazidi constituents.
Rather than jumpstarting reconstruction and governance, PMU rule since October has further dispersed the Yazidi community. As long as the Iraqi government remains weak, Sinjar will be fought over by external forces because of its strategic location close to the borders with Syria and Turkey. Abadi should incorporate fighters of competing militias into a unified police force and restore governance via administrative institutions that open their doors to skilled local personnel regardless of which outside actor they aligned themselves with in the recent past. Whether Abadi is capable of such an approach is an open question.
The problems in Sinjar reflect the broader challenge of demobilising militias and integrating their fighters into state security forces, lest they undermine central authority and prevent the emergence of functioning state institutions.
The town and the surrounding district of the same name belong to Ninewa governorate, of which Mosul is the capital, and are part of what the Iraqi constitution refers to as disputed territories: fourteen administrative districts spread over four governorates nominally under central state control but claimed by the Kurdish region.
The status of these territories remains unresolved, but from until mid the peshmerga and security forces of the two main Iraqi Kurdish parties exercised de facto control, including in disputed districts of Ninewa governorate, after the U. Crisis Group interview, Erbil, 16 March Most, a population estimated at ,,, live in Iraq, centred on Sinjar, Sheikhan, Tel Kayf and Bashiqa; some live in northern Syria; many others are scattered throughout the diaspora. Though Kurdish-speaking, they do not necessarily self-identify as Kurds.
Hide Footnote The jihadists, many of whom were local Sunni Arabs who had long lived peacefully with their Yazidi neighbours, launched a campaign of killings, kidnappings and forced conversions of the Yazidis, taking women and girls as sex slaves.
Urban rail progress in Najaf and Baghdad | News | Railway Gazette International
Survivors fled inside Sinjar mountain, the massive rock formation that rises from the desert floor and both defines and divides the district geographically. The real number of displaced could be much higher. But they then turned on each other in a tense standoff that ensured that no Yazidis could return home. Alien forces are waging their wars on Yazidi lands. Sinjar mountain no longer belongs to us; it has become a square on a chessboard over which these forces compete. The Yazidis will not be able to return home for another ten years; we can no longer trust anyone to protect us.
Losing Sinjar to us is like travelling with a compass that has no north.
Iraq unrest: PM Abdul Mahdi to resign after bloodiest day in protests
This report sheds light on this small corner of Iraq, whose population is neglected while its territory is contested with unremitting ardour. It is based on several visits to the area, as well as conversations with representatives of the various parties concerned over the past two years.
- Generating Electricity Using Photovoltaic Solar Plants in Iraq;
- 1. INTRODUCTION.
- executive dating services Kampala Uganda!
When U. In , their leaders had negotiated an autonomy arrangement with Saddam. But autonomy was not fully realised until , when the defeat of Iraqi forces in Kuwait provided Kurdish rebel parties, protected by the U. Sinjar was the western-most of the districts and strategic for other reasons.