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Save Year end party with Xiao Zhan to your collection. Tue, Jan 19, PM. All subsequent Maddox torpedo reports are doubtful in that it is suspected that sonarman was hearing the ship's own propeller beat" [ sic ]. Within thirty minutes of August 4 incident, Johnson had decided on retaliatory attacks dubbed " Operation Pierce Arrow ". That same day he used the "hot line" to Moscow, and assured the Soviets he had no intent in opening a broader war in Vietnam.
Early on August 5, Johnson publicly ordered retaliatory measures stating, "The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to the government of South Vietnam will be redoubled by this outrage. On August 5, at , these planes bombed four torpedo boat bases and an oil-storage facility in Vinh. Shortly before midnight, on August 4, Johnson interrupted national television to make an announcement in which he described an attack by North Vietnamese vessels on two U.
Navy warships, Maddox and Turner Joy , and requested authority to undertake a military response.
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He emphasized commitment to both the American people, and the South Vietnamese government. He also reminded Americans that there was no desire for war. While Johnson's final resolution was being drafted, US Senator Wayne Morse attempted to hold a fundraiser to raise awareness about possible faulty records of the incident involving Maddox. Morse supposedly received a call from an informant who has remained anonymous urging Morse to investigate official logbooks of Maddox. After urging Congress that they should be wary of Johnson's coming attempt to convince Congress of his resolution, Morse failed to gain enough cooperation and support from his colleagues to mount any sort of movement to stop it.
He contended in speeches to Congress that the actions taken by the United States were actions outside the constitution and were "acts of war rather than acts of defense.
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Morse's efforts were not immediately met with support, largely because he revealed no sources and was working with very limited information. Morse was defeated when he ran for re-election in The US government was still seeking evidence on the night of August 4 when Johnson gave his address to the American public on the incident; messages recorded that day indicate that neither Johnson nor McNamara was certain of an attack.
Various news sources, including Time , Life and Newsweek , published articles throughout August on the Tonkin Gulf incident. The use of the set of incidents as a pretext for escalation of U. They stepped up sabotage and hit-and-run attacks on the coast of North Vietnam. For this purpose, it was authorized to approach the coast as close as 13 kilometers 8 mi and the offshore islands as close as four; the latter had already been subjected to shelling from the sea.
In his book, Body of Secrets , James Bamford , who spent three years in the United States Navy as an intelligence analyst, writes that the primary purpose of the Maddox "was to act as a seagoing provocateur—to poke its sharp gray bow and the American flag as close to the belly of North Vietnam as possible, in effect shoving its five-inch cannons up the nose of the communist navy.
The Maddox ' mission was made even more provocative by being timed to coincide with commando raids, creating the impression that the Maddox was directing those missions Provocative action against North Vietnam was considered [ by whom? John McNaughton suggested in September that the U. By early afternoon of August 4, Washington time, Herrick had reported to the Commander in Chief Pacific in Honolulu that "freak weather effects" on the ship's radar had made such an attack questionable. In fact, Herrick was now saying, in a message sent at pm Washington time, that no North Vietnamese patrol boats had actually been sighted.
Herrick now proposed a "complete evaluation before any further action taken. McNamara later testified that he had read the message after his return to the Pentagon that afternoon. But he did not immediately call Johnson to tell him that the whole premise of his decision at lunch to approve McNamara's recommendation for retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam was now highly questionable. Had Johnson been accurately informed about the Herrick message, he might have demanded fuller information before proceeding with a broadening of the war.
Johnson had fended off proposals from McNamara and other advisers for a policy of bombing the North on four occasions since becoming president. Johnson, who was up for election that year, ordered retaliatory air strikes and went on national television on August 4. Navy had supported South Vietnamese military operations in the Gulf. He thus characterized the attack as "unprovoked" since the ship had been in international waters. As a result of his testimony, on August 7, Congress passed a joint resolution H. RES , titled the Southeast Asia Resolution, which granted Johnson the authority to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia without the benefit of a declaration of war.
The resolution gave Johnson approval "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. Johnson commented privately: "For all I know, our navy was shooting at whales out there. White soon arrived in Washington to meet with Senator Fulbright to discuss his concerns, particularly the faulty sonar reports. In , Captain Herrick and journalist Robert Scheer re-examined Herrick's ship's log and determined that the first torpedo report from August 4, which Herrick had maintained had occurred—the "apparent ambush"—was in fact unfounded.
Although information obtained well after the fact supported Captain Herrick's statements about the inaccuracy of the later torpedo reports as well as the Herrick and Scheer conclusion about the inaccuracy of the first, indicating that there was no North Vietnamese attack that night, at the time U. As a result, planes from the aircraft carriers Ticonderoga and Constellation were sent to hit North Vietnamese torpedo boat bases and fuel facilities during Operation Pierce Arrow.
Stockdale wrote in his book Love and War : "[I] had the best seat in the house to watch that event, and our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets—there were no PT boats there There was nothing there but black water and American fire power. After he was captured, this knowledge became a heavy burden. He later said he was concerned that his captors would eventually force him to reveal what he knew about the second incident. Eugene Poteat wrote that he was asked in early August to determine if the radar operator's report showed a real torpedo boat attack or an imagined one.
He asked for further details on time, weather and surface conditions. No further details were forthcoming. In the end he concluded that there were no torpedo boats on the night in question, and that the White House was interested only in confirmation of an attack, not that there was no such attack.
Shortly thereafter, radar contact of "several high speed contacts closing in on them" was acquired by the USS Turner Joy , which locked on to one of the contacts, fired and struck the torpedo boat. There were 18 witnesses, both enlisted and officers, who reported various aspects of the attack; smoke from the stricken torpedo boat, torpedo wakes reported by four individuals on each destroyer , sightings of the torpedo boats moving through the water and searchlights.
All 18 of the witnesses testified at a hearing in Olongapo, Philippines, and their testimony is a matter of public record. In the foreword, he notes "Among the many books written on the Vietnamese war, half a dozen note a letter to the editor of a Connecticut newspaper which was instrumental in pressuring the Johnson administration to tell the truth about how the war started. The letter was mine. Schaperjahn confirmed White's assertions that Maddox ' s sonar reports were faulty and the Johnson administration knew it prior to going to Congress to request support for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
White's book explains the difference between lies of commission and lies of omission. Johnson was guilty of willful lies of omission. White was featured in the August issue of Connecticut Magazine. Hanyok , a historian for the U. National Security Agency , concluded that the NSA distorted intelligence reports passed to policy makers regarding the August 4, incident.
The NSA historian agency said staff " deliberately skewed " the evidence to make it appear that an attack had occurred. According to intelligence officials, the view of government historians that the report should become public was rebuffed by policy makers concerned that comparisons might be made to intelligence used to justify the Iraq War Operation Iraqi Freedom which commenced in This would have been communicated back to the NSA along with evidence supporting such a conclusion, but in fact the evidence did not do that. Hanyok attributed this to the deference that the NSA would have likely given to the analysts who were closer to the event.
There was no political motive to their action. On November 30, , the NSA released a first installment of previously classified information regarding the Gulf of Tonkin incident, including a moderately sanitized version of Hanyok's article. As much as anything else, it was an awareness that Johnson would brook no uncertainty that could undermine his position.
Faced with this attitude, Ray Cline was quoted as saying " Everyone knew how volatile LBJ was.
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He did not like to deal with uncertainties. A moderately sanitized version of the overall history [63] was released in January by the National Security Agency and published by the Federation of American Scientists.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Military engagements during the Vietnam War. Main article: Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. March 4, — via YouTube. Crucible Vietnam: Memoir of an Infantry Lieutenant. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland. Archived from the original on March 2, Retrieved September 12, February 19, Retrieved November 9, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Retrieved May 7, Law of the Sea Zones in the Pacific Ocean. Retrieved October 29, New York: New, George Washington University. October 25, August 4, Archived from the original on December 23, Retrieved October 27, Archived from the original on November 21, Retrieved July 23, Communication Quarterly.
August 5, Remarks on Vietnam at Syracuse University Speech. Syracuse University Graduation Ceremony. Retrieved June 7, Truth is the First Casualty. Oregon Blue Book. Salem, Oregon: Office of the Secretary of State, The Politics of Lying: government deception, secrecy, and power. New York: Vintage Books. The Guardian.